The U.S. Economy: A 
                Few Bad Apples or Tip of the Iceberg? 
              By 
                Keith W. Rabin and Scott B. MacDonald
              In the face of massive 
                stock market volatility, wealth erosion and concern over almost 
                daily accounting and corporate governance scandals, there is considerable 
                discussion about the need to cull the few "bad apples" 
                that are giving U.S. business a bad name.
                
                Many analysts and television talking heads note that Main Street 
                is demanding the culprits be apprehended and made to do hard time. 
                Congress is busy passing legislation to deal with corporate sleaze. 
                This thinking reflects the common perception that most corporations 
                are managed by honest people and that the main task at hand is 
                to root out the egregious examples of fraud that are shattering 
                investor confidence. Then, it is believed, market concern can 
                be alleviated and U.S. firms can return to what they do best - 
                make profits. With U.S. business refocused on profits (as well 
                as better corporate governance), the economic recovery will be 
                assured, the stock market will go back up, and the American public 
                will regain lost confidence in buying securities.
              While it is true that most 
                managers are honest and indeed critical to make examples of executives 
                who commit criminal fraud, this type of thinking misses the boat. 
                Yes, the outright deception that characterized the Enron, WorldCom, 
                Tyco and other debacles are special cases, but the late 1990s 
                tendency to engage in highly aggressive accounting practices was 
                highly pervasive -- even though most firms remained within the 
                lines of ethical corporate behavior. It should be remembered that 
                following the Arthur Andersen debacle, there are now 2,400 ex-Andersen 
                accounts forced to reexamine everything that was reported over 
                the last several years. This will have a negative effect on earnings 
                moving forward as it is probable that at the very least a number 
                of firms will have to restate earnings - not a good signal to 
                an already highly sensitive bear market. Therefore, one might 
                view the current paradigm as more similar to exposing the tip 
                of the iceberg than the need to clean out a few bad apples.
              As the late 1990s Internet 
                boom accelerated, traditional rules of business behavior and corporate 
                valuation were eroded. In the land grab that characterized this 
                era, growth of market share was seen by many to be more important 
                than profitability. Many concluded it was better to invest in 
                new, speculative firms who had little more than a business plan 
                and venture capital funding. These enterprises enjoyed massive 
                capital inflows without the need to endure the analytical rigors 
                and performance expectations imposed upon companies with real 
                revenues and operating histories. Emerging firms such as Amazon, 
                eBay and eToys quickly amassed market capitalizations that were 
                larger than many Fortune 50 corporations.
              To remain competitive, 
                established firms turned to high-octane financial engineers. As 
                if by magic, they transformed balance sheets and income statements 
                in a manner that delivered the progressively improving performance 
                demanded by the financial community. Two exemplars of this trend, 
                Andrew Fastow of Enron and Scott Sullivan of WorldCom, were lionized 
                for their achievements and recognized as being in the forefront 
                of business finance. Each received "Best CFOs" ratings 
                in annual competitions by CFO Magazine. Corporate finance managers 
                recognized this change in sentiment and adapted their institutional 
                values accordingly. The message was clear. CFOs and controllers 
                who wanted to get ahead adopted an aggressive stance. Those that 
                maintained a conservative posture were viewed as old-fashioned 
                relics of the past.
              Today, we are presented 
                with a very different dynamic. Many of the practices seen as highly 
                clever and cutting edge only a year or two ago are now viewed 
                as scandalous. Good, conservative accounting practices, which 
                could likely have been grounds for
                dismissal in 1997-2000, are now seen as desirable virtues. Corporate 
                behavior is beginning to reflect this new reality. This in essence 
                is what is so troubling about the current "bad apple" 
                debate, which maintains that once the few fragrantly fraudulent 
                offenders are rooted out, the "silent majority" of good, 
                honorable companies can regain the valuations they deserve. Matters 
                are not so black and white nor is it a case of good versus evil.
              Accounting is far more 
                art than science. As anyone who has engaged in the preparation 
                of complex financial statements can observe, numerous subjective 
                judgements are required as to how to classify and treat each and 
                every item. President Bush acknowledged this phenomenon in a recent 
                press conference. When asked about Harken Energy, he noted something 
                to the effect "in the corporate world, not everything is 
                black and white and sometimes there are honest disagreements on 
                how to account for complex transactions."
              As the smell test of what 
                is normal and ethical shifts from overly aggressive to even mildly 
                conservative, it will have profound implications on the standards 
                that govern audits and the behavior of corporate finance professionals. 
                Most corporations - whether or not they have engaged in any fraudulent 
                behavior -- will be far more reserved in their accounting and 
                corporate profitability will inevitably suffer as a result. This 
                represents an obstacle that has not been sufficiently recognized 
                or factored into the expectations of many analysts and investors.
              It therefore does not seem 
                realistic to imagine that even if the U.S. could show dramatic 
                2002 GDP growth beyond the 2-3% anticipated by most economists, 
                that we will see the earnings revisions that will lead to the 
                rapid upwards valuations needed to lift share prices.
              Far more likely is a continuation 
                of the current scenario, in which we continue to slowly work off 
                the excesses of the dot.com era. Real growth and achievements 
                will be masked by a continual procession of announcements concerning 
                accounting and other
                irregularities - not to mention the major uncertainties caused 
                by the continuing war on terrorism. In the end corporate America 
                will emerge all the stronger. However, a belief that we simply 
                have to uncover all the "bad apples" to rectify all 
                that is wrong with the current market environment will only delay 
                the ultimate resolution of these important issues.