By
Scott B. MacDonald
For all the discussion about the split between the United States
and Europe over Iraq, the fundamental issue is that the international
political system is heading back into spheres of influence. The
Western alliance is becoming history. This was bound to happen.
We sometimes forget that nature abhors a vacuum. Perhaps having
a single superpower is a little bit like a vacuum – so many
places to play policemen and not enough soldiers to go around.
Now, we see the drift away from uni-polarity back to multi-polarity,
with President Jacques Chirac of France, backed by Germany’s
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and, to a lesser extent, Russia’s
Vladimir Putin, leading the way to asserting Europe’s independence
vis-à-vis the United States. We also see a more self-confident
China, willing to defy the U.S. on Iraq and quietly asserting
itself in Southeast Asia.
The main indicator of the return of spheres of influence foreign
policy is evident in recent encounters between the United States
and Europeans. The United States is now in the process of seeking
to re-write the Middle Eastern map to its advantage – by
invading Iraq and seeking to create a new democratic-capitalist
government in the place of Saddam Hussein’s regime. From
this point, U.S. power can be easily projected throughout the
region, including those states that have long track records of
supporting international terrorism – Iran, Syria and Saudi
Arabia. Simply stated, the hope is that bad regimes will be replaced
with governments that share the same values as the West –
democracy, elective government, equal rights for men and women,
secular rule of law, and capitalism. Through this process, beginning
with Iraq, even the Palestinian-Israeli issue can be resolved.
Everyone will benefit, in particular, the United States, which
will clearly be dominant in the region for a long time. While
oil is part of the equation, it is only a small part.
President Jacques Chirac is actively re-asserting France’s
sphere of influence – in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
By opposing war against Iraq -- as opposed to standing up for
Saddam Hussein -- France is standing tall among the Arab world,
a longstanding French constituency based on history, economic
and political ties, and France’s own Muslim population of
about 6 million individuals. President Chirac in March also visited
Algeria, where he was given a hero’s welcome from estatic
crowds. France considers Algeria important and has been a strong
base of support for the embattled quasi-authoritarian, yet secular
government. France also carries considerable clout in relations
with its former North African colonies of Morocco and Tunisia.
At the same time, French troops have been sent to the Ivory Coast,
where they helped to impose a peace plan. French troops are based
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, clearly representing France’s
national interest in what was traditionally its sphere of influence.
While France and Germany are asserting their sphere of influence
in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Russia remains the dominant
player in parts of Central Asia. However, the projection of U.S.
power in the region, in particular, in the former Soviet republics
around Afghanistan, is a point of concern in Moscow. On one hand
the Russians are happy to have the U.S. as an ally in the fight
against global radical Islam. They also like foreign investment
in their economy. However, the Russians do not like U.S. forces
in the region and there is come jockeying for influence. This
explains the recent thaw in relations between Russia and the European
Union, in particular, with France. Whereas French and German governments
were vocal over Russia’s heavy-handed actions in Chenynia,
those criticisms have become far more muted over recent months.
Closer ties with France and Germany also provide Russia with some
leverage over the United States.
The other two major players in the regional spheres of influence
game are China and India. China clearly looks to Southeast Asia
and the South China Sea as zones of influence, where its economic
and military power are evident. Beijing also has influence in
Korea, though would rather have the United States bear the costs
of North Korea’s failed economy. China also has a good relationship
with Pakistan, which it uses to counterbalance India. For its
part, India is the major regional power in South Asia. It is also
seeking to play a more active role in Southeast Asia, standing
up for Malaysia’s Indian population and seeking to develop
a closer military relationship with Singapore.
The return to spheres of influence is a hardly finished development.
The United States has not surrendered being the dominant and sole
superpower or its option of going it alone when it observes its
national interests at risk. U.S. military power remains a major
factor in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. And economically
speaking no other economy can come close in sheer size and ability
to generate world growth. At the same time, the Franco-German
gambit to make Europe stand tall vis-à-vis the Americans
has not gone well with many other European nations. Certainly
the UK, Spain and Italy have taken a different Iraqi policy path
from that dictated from Paris and Berlin. In addition, prospective
Central and Eastern European members to the European Union have
a greater sense of unease with Paris-Berlin leadership, especially
after French President Jacques Chirac’s recent comments of
their “immaturity”, which recalls similar hegemonic
behavior reminiscent of the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc.
In Asia, China’s “influence” is hardly bringing
North Korea to heel. India cannot control the violence in Nepal
that is creeping toward civil war. Russia is still not able to
stop acts of terrorism in the Caucasus.
What does this mean for those countries without spheres of influence?
A major concern of this trend is that globalization is likely
to be curtailed. Political spheres of influence also have an economic
component. Political tensions in other areas are likely to creep
into trade talks or further efforts for financial liberalization.
This poises significant risks for countries, such as Japan, Korea
and Chile that have placed an emphasis on international trade
and export-led economic growth. Japan, long a free rider in military
power agreements, will increasingly be forced to compete with
China in maintaining an economic sphere of influence in the rest
of Asia. This raises the tough questions of the durability of
the U.S. alliance and how far Japan wants to go in upgrading its
military.
If the current drift into spheres of influence continues, prospects
for political tensions are likely to increase. Multi-polar world
political systems are more unstable than uni-polar or bi-polar
ones. Competing spheres of influence usually lead to confrontation.
Prior to both World Wars, the global political system was decidedly
multi-polar - and inherently unstable as proved by the two following
bloodbaths. We are left with the words of Lord Palmerston, a British
prime minister during the Victorian era, who observed: “There
are no permanent alliances, only permanent interests.”
