By
Scott B. MacDonald
In early August, the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta was bombed.
The bomber was an Islamic radical, who drove a van into the front
of the hotel, killing 12 people and wounding over a hundred others.
Most of those killed or injured were Indonesian. The Marriott
bombing follows the Bali bombing of October 2002, two other bombings
in Jakarta (one at the parliament) and an alleged plot to kill
the country’s president Megawati Sukarnoputri. Although Indonesian
authorities are reluctant to admit it, the rise of Islamic terrorism
runs the risk of polarizing society and endangering the relatively
secular nature of the government. It also casts a large shadow
over the future of the country’s fledgling democracy as well
as the attractiveness of Indonesia as a place for foreign investment.
While the Indonesian government is a considerable distance from
being ousted from power, local radical Islam and its foreign links
to al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah (JI) represent a very challenging
problem with long-term implications for Southeast Asia’s
largest country as well as the rest of Asia.
There are two sides of the coin in looking at Indonesia and Islamic
terrorism. On one side of the coin, Indonesia has a long tradition
of a tolerant form of Islam, which has functioned as a support
for political stability. It has also been a pillar of Indonesian
nationalism, a force that helps bind the country together. This
was especially the case during the struggle for independence during
the 1940s. During the Suharto years, Islam was carefully controlled
and there was an emphasis placed maintaining a secular society,
able to accommodate a Muslim majority, but carving out a tolerance
for the Hindu, Christian and other smaller religious communities.
With the end of the Suharto years and the advent of Indonesian
democracy, the role of Islam in society suddenly became more central.
Indeed, with the departure of East Timor, the overall numbers
of Muslims as a percentage of the total population increased.
The other side of the coin is that as the Islamic face of Indonesian
society has become more distinct and more mainstream, the door
has also opened for radicals within the same community to emerge
from the shadows, developing international ties to like-minded
groups and recruiting more followers. Certainly the shift to a
more open political system has brought about a higher degree of
uncertainty in Indonesia. Together with the round-robin of presidential
leadership since 1997 and tough economic times until recently,
radical Islam has become attractive as it projects a clear-cut,
simple answer to complicated issues.
Another aspect of the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia is that
the political class is seeking to manipulate this force. With
the unpopularity of the American war against Iraq and the close
U.S. alignment with Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians,
another Islamic people, radical Islamists have been quick to articulate
their views and to find a sympathetic audience in the majority
of Indonesians. This by no means infers that most Indonesians
favor radical Islam, the creation of a theocratic state along
the lines of Iran, or are inclined to attack the West and its
allies. What it does mean is that radical Islam touches a sensitive
spot in the country’s identity – the West has long looked
down on Islamic peoples. In a sense, there is a sense of grievance.
After all, the Dutch long colonized Indonesia and took its natural
resources. Western companies made money in the country, and Suharto
was long supported by the United States. In addition, it is argued
the IMF made life miserable for many Indonesians with its poorly
conceived economic policies.
The danger is that elements of the political elite are still playing
to radical Islamic groups, or at the very least pandering to public
sentiment vis-à-vis the unfairness of an international
order dominated by the United States. The comments of Vice President
Hamzah Haz in calling the United States, the “king of terrorists
for its war crimes in Iraq” certainly must be seen in this
context. Haz was responding to international criticism that Indonesia
had been lenient in sentencing Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual
leader of JI, to only four years of jail. Haz is the leader of
the conservative Islamic United Development party (PPP). He has
in the past been willing to be seen courting some of the country’s
more radical Islamic figures.
While some groups are playing to the Islamic radicals, others
remain strongly opposed or are waiting for their turn to take
advantage of potential weakness in central authority. President
Megawait Sukarnoputri is conducting a war against Islamic separatists
in Aceh (on the northern tip of Sumatra) and is seeking to contain
separatists in other regions. At the same time, presidential elections
loom in early 2004. If the President slips in conducting the war,
if she pushes too hard on Islamic groups in a predominantly Islamic
country, or if she appears to be in the lap of the United States,
her political prospects are likely to weaken. Moreover, she must
tread softly with the military. Any loss of power from the civilian
part of the political spectrum could be gained by the military,
one of the few cohesive institutions in the country. In the past,
it has also been one of the most influential. If civilian leadership
is inadequate, there are leaders within the armed forces that
might be tempted to step into the picture, probably in the shadows,
much like Indonesian puppet plays.
What complicates matters for Indonesia is that it is not a small,
insignificant country. Rather, it is a pivotal nation, located
astride major lines of communication and trade between East Asia
and the Middle East and Europe. It is also the world’s largest
Islamic nation and a major producer of oil and natural gas. For
all these reasons, what happens in Indonesia matters. Consequently,
the approach of the Megawati government to radical Islamic terrorism
is a concern to more than just the local population. It is a point
of concern to Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Manila, Singapore and
Manila. The failure to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
money-laundering regulations, which are aimed at hurting illegal
financial activities in the country -- which could aid Islamic
terrorist groups -- gives the impression that Indonesia is soft
on tackling the problem.
Perceptions remain important in a globalized world – like
it or not. This is important for attracting foreign investment
as well as how the country interacts with the rest of the region.
While the U.S. has often pushed too hard on Indonesia and certainly
played to the sense of Islamic grievance, Indonesia’s political
elite also has to consider its responsibility to its citizens
in providing sustainable economic development, a better standard
of living, and clear government. Supporting men with bombs willing
to kill their fellow Indonesians in grisly acts of violence is
not going to build a better future for the country.
