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Analogy and Irony: America in Afghanistan By Andrew R. Novo NEW YORK (KWR) August 18, 2010 - The arrival of General David Petraeus in Afghanistan represents more than the Obama administration's desire to assert civilian control over the military. The Rolling Stone article that so abruptly terminated General Stanley McCrystal's career has thrust Petraeus back firmly into the spotlight, putting the man many Americans consider their best and brightest commander in charge of the country's greatest military challenge since Vietnam. Petraeus is not only expected to improve on the performance of his predecessor, but also to duplicate his own previous successes during his time as commander of American forces in Iraq. The increased American troop presence that supports Petraeus will provide the manpower necessary to strike hard at the Taliban while protecting the fragile progress in Afghanistan's economy and politics. Petraeus does not have long to work. The Obama administration has done its best to sunset America's involvement in Afghan combat operations to late 2011. Thus, Petraeus's appointment and the surge of American forces represent an apparent contradiction - "doubling-down" in Afghanistan while at the same time making clear that our commitments there are transient. Reducing our troop presence in the country while retaining the ability to strike major targets and gather intelligence in Afghanistan, however, is probably our best strategy. What can we accomplish in the next year? Petraeus's tenure in Afghanistan invites parallels with his turn-around of a difficult situation in Iraq. However, it will not be long before observers question whether "King David," and his famous counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine is winning the "hearts and minds" of Afghans and achieving what bronze-clad Greek, red-coated British, and epauletted Soviet commanders all failed to achieve - the pacification of Afghanistan. Petraeus's COIN doctrine focuses on cooperation with local forces, building trust with the local population, and developing physical infrastructure. It describes American soldiers as both "nation builders and warriors." But building a nation is not why American forces went to Afghanistan. The purpose of America's campaign was the destruction of al-Qaeda and the killing or capture of Osama bin Ladin. With bin Ladin as elusive as ever and al-Qaeda splintered across south Asia, the Middle East, and east Africa, America's goals in Afghanistan have mutated, and not to our advantage. Following September 11, it was unpleasant but logical to enter Afghanistan to destroy and punish al-Qaeda. Staying in Afghanistan and spending American lives and dollars to build Afghanistan as a nation less obviously serves America's interests and strategic needs. One of the greatest challenges for the Petraeus approach will be its reliance on local actors for security and support. Both within Afghanistan and in neighboring countries, too few groups are interested in helping the American-led NATO mission succeed. Taliban hardliners continue to enjoy support from segments of the population. At the same time, many Afghans are too terrified of the Taliban to cooperate with American forces. Resurgent Taliban forces have become notorious for brutally punishing and threatening Afghans who collaborate with American forces or try to expand the rights of women. This deficit in local support is one of the major obstacles to peace in Afghanistan. The COIN theory to build the host nation's security forces, to cooperate with them, and to use local partners to build trust with the indigenous population, while minimizing the footprint of external forces is perfectly logical. The implementation of such a policy, however, runs aground if the local actors willing to support the external forces are too weak or too few. The irony is that the "soft" American approach of "hearts and minds" appears to be losing the battle for Afghanistan to Taliban militants who will throw acid in the faces of young girls in order to prevent them from going to school. For the insurgents, the results from terror and brutality are tangible. For the counter-insurgents, the dividends from caution and cooperation are ambiguous. Petraeus, however, is far from dovish. He brings a resolve as strong as McChrystal's to the fight in Afghanistan and will not be shy about employing all necessary weapons to eliminate the Taliban. Removing the most uncompromising and dangerous enemy elements is essential to any kind of progress in Afghanistan. Such operational objectives must focus on the Taliban's leadership. Its "small fry" gunmen come from a seemingly endless supply of disaffected young Muslims hungry for jihad and martyrdom. Sadly, the recruitment of foreign jihadists remains one of the few booming businesses in Afghanistan besides narcotics. Just as during the campaign against the Soviets, ideologically driven fighters are arriving from countries across the Islamic world, particularly Arab nations and trouble spots like Chechnya and Tajikistan. These men are easy for the Taliban to replace. Inflicting real damage on the organization begins with eliminating targets of value. The foreign fighter phenomenon adds another challenge to the already complex situation just beyond Afghanistan's borders. The cooperation of our ally, Pakistan, with the Taliban has been an ongoing issue. Focusing on the perceived threat of India exerting a controlling influence over the Karzai government, Pakistan's intelligence agency supported the Taliban for years and cooperation with American forces is only now beginning to improve. Large numbers of foreign fighters have entered Afghanistan through Pakistan, unhindered by the Pakistani government. The larger regional conflict between India and Pakistan, two nations with which the American government has tried to cultivate more friendly relations in recent years, is a major source of instability for our operations in Afghanistan. Another major source of instability in Afghanistan is the country's crippling poverty. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest and least developed countries with per capita GDP of $500. It consistently ranks at the bottom of the Human Development Index and has a literacy rate of less than 30%. Building the country's economy and providing sustainable alternatives to warlordism and the narcotics trade is a prerequisite for democracy and stability. American forces and the Karzai government need to establish physical infrastructure, to build political and legal institutions, and enhance Afghanistan's human capital through education. Increasing economic opportunities for Afghans in the medium term may do more to undermine the Taliban's position in the country than major military operations. The sad reality is that this is a fight for Afghans, not for the armed forces of the United States and the European Union. The domestic Afghan landscape is littered with obstacles to achieving stability. Local support is hard to generate and easy to lose. Externally, significant international actors are at work undermining American objectives in Afghanistan and fueling resistance. The economy is in shambles. These challenges are arguably more deeply rooted and more pervasive then those confronted in Iraq. Failure is potentially more damaging to American interests. Unless dramatic changes can take place on the ground, General Petraeus and his nation-building warriors will be in a situation parallel not to the successful surge in Iraq, but to the slow death of the Red Army on the very same Afghan mountains. Al-Qaeda was unable to defeat us when they were in Afghanistan; it would be an unbearable irony for them to defeat us there now that they have gone. KWR Viewpoint articles reflect the personal views of KWR consultants or outside contributors. They do not necessarily reflect the view of KWR International, Inc.
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